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MuzzLes and Mixed MessaGes: 
Issues Between Science and the Federal 
Government In Canada’s Past and 
Present
kaTherine richTer 
University of King’s college 
aBsTracT
Richter examines the historical relationship between the fed-
eral government of Canada and the scientists it has employed 
over the past few decades. She compares science policy and 
practices from leaders such as Diefenbaker and Trudeau to the 
policies currently followed by Stephen Harper’s government. 
Richter asks what might be achieved by following those poli-
cies, despite the criticism received by the science community. 
The paper will ultimately argue that the federal government 
and scientists have often had a contentious relationship, and 
the often criticized policies of the current Conservative gov-
ernment are not at all novel. Ultimately, she argues that these 
Conservative policies are intended to present a unified political 
front to the broader Canadian public and to the world.
Keywords: science, federal government, policy, public, political 
history
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The policy of “muzzling” scientists who work for the
federal government has received plenty of attention in Canada over 
the last six years. Scientists, scholars, research committees, and the 
media have all accused Stephen Harper’s current Conservative 
government of creating policies that keep scientists from presenting 
their work, that require them to make media statements through 
government handlers, or that bog down the process of interviews 
through the need for seemingly endless amounts of paperwork. 
Techniques such as these led the NDP in the House of Commons to 
question: when would the Conservative government “end their war 
against our scientists?”1   
Very few would deny that these policies and practices have a 
silencing effect on scientists. The question then is what purpose these 
policies might serve. This paper will examine the history between the 
federal government and the scientists it employed over the past few 
decades, and how that relationship has been marred by the same 
problems the Conservative government is accused of creating today. It 
will then examine the Conservative government’s current policy in 
regards to science, of which muzzling is one part, and will ask what is 
the intended objective. This paper will ultimately argue that the 
federal government and scientists have often had a contentious 
relationship, and the policies the Conservative government is 
currently implementing are not new. They are part of a larger plan by 
the government to get scientific researchers to follow and uphold the 
goals the government intends to pursue. These policies are essentially 
in place to control information, intended to present a unified political 
front to the world and to the broader Canadian public, while 
simultaneously opening Canada to international investment and 
economic interests. 
Canada has often been recognized as a leader and innovator in 
science and technology, and our history is studded with examples that 
showcase our talent. Take, for example, the hydrofoil boat invented 
by Alexander Graham Bell and Casey Baldwin, or the invention of 
insulin by Banting and Best. Canadians themselves are interested in 




science and technology; one report released in 2014 by the Council of 
Canadian Academies put the Canadian public in first place out of 33 
countries for showing a strong interest in “new scientific discoveries 
and technological developments.”2  However, this history has been 
marred by struggles between the federal government and scientists 
over differing opinions, funding research and political ideology. This 
has not been happening only in the last six years, but since science 
became a subject of interest to the government.   
While the muzzling of scientists is a major criticism towards 
the Conservative government’s recent policies against science and 
scientists, it is only one part of those policies. Other actions include 
slashing funding to various research boards or councils, or insisting 
on the appointment of various people that the media and scientists 
claim have no right in interfering with scientific progress. 
Bureaucratic or even Prime Ministerial influence has also been 
claimed as a direct affront to science. However, it is important to note 
that all these policy actions have taken place before in Canada’s 
history.  
The federal government and scientists have enjoyed a rocky 
relationship for decades, and to claim surprise at the current 
government’s policies is to ignore Canada’s political past. Take for 
example the criticism of budget cuts to science. In the past few years, 
climate science has been a particular target for the federal 
government. As Andrew Cuddy points out in his paper on the 
Harper government’s approach to climate science research, funding 
from the federal government for university-based research (through 
channels such as the National Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada, or NSERC) has been slashed, making NSERC’s 
budget fall to less than half of their original funding since 
2010-2011.3 This is particularly upsetting for researchers, as the 
country is currently dealing with a climate change crisis. As one 
scientist from Dalhousie University noted, “Canada will lose the 
capacity to understand its own environment and will have to rely on 
other countries to know what’s happening to it.”4 Bill C-38, 
2. “Science Culture: Where Canada Stands,” Council of Canadian Academies, accessed October 14,
2014, xvi, http://www.scienceadvice.ca/en/assessments/completed/science-culture.aspx
3. Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 15.
4. Ibid.
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the Harper government’s omnibus budget bill released in July 2012, 
also cut funding and issued letters of potential layoff to thousands of 
scientists and researchers in the federal government “on a level not 
previously seen, or tolerated.”5 
 These concerns about the federal government cutting funding 
for scientific research (while valid) are not new. Issues such as these 
have been arising for decades. For example, many saw the creation of 
the Science Council of Canada (or SCC) in the mid-1960s as a 
gesture that gave new importance to the scientific and post-war world 
and that spoke to the important financial and advisory relationship 
between science and the federal government.6 The SCC relied on 
federal funding, and for years provided independent “arms-length” 
advice to both the public and the federal government by releasing 
scientific reports on a variety of subjects. However, the Council ran 
into trouble in 1978 when it released a report on the problems facing 
the Canadian industry and manufacturing areas. It essentially implied 
the economic structures of the country were so poor that Canada 
could be considered a “third-world country.”7 This did not sit well 
with the federal government, and by 1985, Brian Mulroney’s 
Conservative government released a report (also known as the Nielsen 
report) that would lead to the decimation of the SCC’s budget (which 
halved their five million dollar budget).8 Although the SCC managed 
to hang on with its new minuscule budget that barely allowed for the 
continuation of its research, let alone funding for new projects, the 
budget cut represented a blow that the SCC could never recover 
from, and the program folded in 1992.9 The federal government 
began to perceive the SCC as a threat to its economic policies, and 
used the Nielsen report to justify its funding cuts to that threat, an 
attitude that is also seen in today’s political climate. 
 Another major criticism of the Harper government’s current 
actions towards science and scientific research comes from its 
perceived interference with the scientific community through 
bureaucrats, ministerial spokespeople and even media handlers. One 
5. Turner, The War on Science, 8.
6. G. Brent Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy and the Retreat From Transformative Politics: The 
Final Years of the Science Council of Canada, 1985-1992,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the 
History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 108.
7. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,”119. 
8. Ibid., 125.
9. Ibid., 126. 
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of the most striking examples was in 2012, when federal government 
media handlers shadowed Environment Canada scientists to prevent 
them discussing polar bears or climate change with reporters at an 
international conference on polar issues.10 Chris Turner cites another 
example of non-scientific interference in scientific business through 
the implementation of Bill C-38. According to Turner, this bill, 
which so drastically cut federally funded science projects and fired 
hundreds of researchers, was put together in a set of private meetings 
by lawyers, party staffers, a farmer, management consultants and a 
fighter pilot – but no scientists or researchers.11 How, Turner seems to 
be asking, can we expect science to be given the proper respect it 
deserves in policy if no scientists are involved in the decisions that 
will decide its future?  
 Yet this political interference in what many consider the realm 
of scientists has been around since scientific research began to interest 
the federal government – indeed, some interference has been a direct 
result of the Prime Minister himself. This attitude of muzzling (or at 
least ignoring) scientists and industry experts can be striking. One of 
the most famous examples comes from Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker, who led the Progressive Conservative party in the federal 
government from 1957 to 1963. He held an attitude that gave low 
priority to scientists and he also apparently objected to being 
surrounded “with bureaucratic advisors – scientists or otherwise.”12 
This dislike of other opinions would be demonstrated in 
Diefenbaker’s decision to cancel the Avro Arrow project in 1959. He 
based his decision on the growing costs for the project, and the so-
called “obsolescence” of having a manned bomber threaten Canadian 
airspace, ignoring the hundreds of calls from industry experts and 
scientists to save the project.13 With one stroke, Diefenbaker cut the 
program and sent many of Canada’s top scientists and industry 
leaders looking for jobs elsewhere.  
 Diefenbaker also demonstrated his attitude towards scientists 
by insisting on the construction of a new radar laboratory in his home 
10. Jonathon Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.” Maclean’s, May 3, 2013. http://www.macleans.ca/
news/canada/when-science-goes-silent/ 
11. Turner, The War on Science, 29. 
12. G. Bruce Doern, Science and Politics in Canada (Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972), 
144. 
13. Doern, Science and Politics in Canada, 145. 
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riding of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan in 1957. Researchers had 
suggested building the laboratory in the area of the nearby city of 
Saskatoon, as it would be closer to the University of Saskatchewan 
and suited the preferences of the Defense Research Board. Instead, 
the laboratory was built in Prince Albert, and served as another 
example of Diefenbaker’s refusal to listen to scientists, and to instead 
pursue agendas and plans he believed were right.14 This attitude might 
well come from Diefenbaker’s desire to uphold his particular image: a 
politician concerned with the common man, not the bureaucrats and 
pencil-pushers. By doing what he thought was right, Diefenbaker 
demonstrated to the voting public that “experts” had no sway over his 
final decisions. Kenneth McNaught goes so far as to label 
Diefenbaker’s party leadership as near-populist.15 While these 
examples may stem from Diefenbaker’s personal motivations (doing 
good for the average voter) or mistrusts (of scientists and 
bureaucrats), they are still somewhat shocking, even in today’s cynical 
political-scientific climate. 
 Another example of political interference in the scientific 
sphere can be found by examining the history of the Defense 
Research Board (DRB). This board, which was created in 1947 and 
lasted until 1977, was designed to meet Canada’s research needs 
during the post-war years. Its agenda was directly related to the 
federal government in that its mandate was to serve the Minister and 
related Department of National Defense (DND).16 Both scientists 
and industry leaders sat on the board. However, by the 1950’s 
tensions were rising over the new implementation of portfolios such 
as the Department of Defense Production, which was seen by some as 
adding political opinions and more bureaucrats to the scientific 
realm.17 This complaint would be repeated when experts in 
administration and organization, commissioned by the federal 
government, released a report criticizing the structure of the DND in 
1972. The subsequent criticism from the DND – how were non-
military and non-scientific ‘experts’ able to understand, let alone 
17. Jonathan Turner, “Politics and Defence Research in the Cold War,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian 
Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 55, doi: 10.7202/1013980ar
15. Kenneth McNaught, The Pelican History of Canada (Markham: Penguin Books, 1983), 300. 
16. Turner, “Politics and Defense Research,” 41. 
17. Ibid., 50. 
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criticize the work of military science and technology – was ignored.18 
In another example, all appointments to the DRB had to be approved 
by the Minister of National Defense, from the secretaries to the 
highest researchers on the board.19 Ultimately, these examples may be 
reminiscent of policies pursued in recent years by Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative government, but they do demonstrate that political 
interference has the power to effect some serious change, and it has 
done so for a very long time. 
 Finally, Harper’s government has been most heavily criticized 
on the “muzzling” of scientists – that is, preventing federal scientists 
from presenting papers, implementing new media policies that forbid 
them from talking to the media, or even threatening them with severe 
sanctions should they not comply. For example, Jonathon Gatehouse’s 
article for Maclean’s magazine describes a situation where a federal 
scientist at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was given a 
formal reprimand for talking to the media without receiving 
permission from the minister’s office. He was informed he could 
potentially lose his job if the incident occurred again.20 This situation 
was criticized as a lost educational opportunity for other scientists and 
for the Canadian public. It should be noted that the scientist was not 
named in the Maclean’s article, for fear of “further sanctions.”21 This 
fear is not isolated to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans: one 
report jointly released by Evidence for Democracy and Simon Fraser 
University noted that 90% of federal scientists felt they were unable 
“to speak freely about their research.”22  
 That same report heavily criticized the new media policies of 
government departments, including Environment Canada, the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the Canadian Space Agency, and 
Natural Resources Canada. These policies have attracted plenty of 
attention. For example, the media policy at Environment Canada 
insists that scientists put all media inquiries to a media relations 
officer, who will then determine if the scientist can respond or not. 
That same media policy also insists that scientists give no personal 
18. Ibid., 61.
19. Ibid., 52. 
20. Jonathon Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent,” Maclean’s, May 3, 2013, http://www.macleans.ca/
news/canada/when-science-goes-silent/.
21. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
22. Karen Magnuson-Ford and Katie Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?” Evidence For Democracy, 3, 
accessed October 12th, 2014.  
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opinions when speaking in an official capacity, either on the subject at 
hand or on Environment Canada policy in general.23 These restrictive 
and time-consuming policies have resulted in a significant decrease in 
the amount of media coverage that science and science-related issues 
now receive, writes Andrew Cuddy in a critique on the current 
government’s approaches to climate science research.24 Cuddy also 
notes that this same Environment Canada policy could potentially 
violate the government’s Communications Policy, which recognizes 
institutions must understand and appreciate the importance of the 
“24 hour media environment.”25 These are only a few examples, but 
they serve as proof that the Harper government is using bureaucracy, 
power and policy to stop (or at the very least, slow down) scientist’s 
attempts to communicate important results and breakthroughs with 
the media. 
 However, once again, this idea of “muzzling” scientists 
through government policy is not new, and the troubles of the now-
dead Science Council of Canada (SCC), created in the mid-1960s, 
serve as an excellent example. It was created as a step towards 
“technological sovereignty”, and was designed to assist to the federal 
government and the Canadian public by providing “arms-length” 
advice on science and policy.26 It was supposed to operate separately 
from the influences of the government: this was what gave it 
credibility. Yet as it fell under criticism in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the 
Minister of State for Science and Technology suddenly suggested the 
SCC be merged into his department, thereby removing that “arm’s 
length” position that was so important to the Council’s independent 
nature. The Council was horrified, and while they would manage to 
keep their independence,27 the budget cuts that accompanied these 
suggestions would kill the council. Interestingly, in public press 
conferences held around the same time, Council members described 
the financial cuts as “an attempt to muzzle the Council and destroy its 
independent voice (emphasis added).”28 Thanks to this massive 
budget reduction, the Council could only serve in the late 1980’s as 
23. Magnuson-Ford and Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?” 13. 
24. Andrew Cuddy, Troubling Evidence: The Harper Government’s Approach to Climate Science Research in 
Canada (Ottawa: Climate Action Network Canada, 2010), 1. 
25. Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 25. 




an information station, telling Canadians where their scientific 
futures could have lain,29 instead of their original purpose, which had 
been to inform and even influence the federal government and the 
Canadian public based on sound science. Just as federal scientists are 
silenced today by government policy, so too were scientists from the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 It is important to note that these were policies upheld by both 
Liberal and Conservative political parties in the federal government. 
Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives may have profited from 
this silencing (or perhaps took inspiration from it – they, after all, 
released the Nielsen report), but it became an issue under Pierre 
Trudeau’s Liberals in the 1970’s. Trudeau’s two terms were marked by 
demonstrations of strength in his majority position, and included acts 
such as the enlargement of the Office of the Prime Minister and the 
consolidation of several departmental organizations.30 This desire to 
demonstrate the power of the federal government could be seen in 
these silencing policies, as well as the criticisms of the DND in 1972. 
Perhaps Trudeau’s government used their majority to prove to others 
they had the power to do what they wanted, and could chose to listen 
to whomever they wanted? Whatever the government’s motivation, it 
was scientists that suffered for it.   
 Ultimately, these historical examples demonstrate that the 
policies pursued by Harper’s Conservative government are not new, 
and that past federal governments have pursued similar policies. 
Whether through funding cuts, interference by bureaucrats at all 
levels, or implementation of media and management policies, the 
government has proven it is not afraid to use the tools it has at its 
disposal such as legislative power and political clout to silence its 
scientific critics, or to override them should they not serve the 
government’s interests. The question is, what purpose does the 
government believe this muzzling policy serves – and does that 
purpose serve the Canadian public in a positive or a negative way?  
There may be a variety of reasons for the Harper government to 
follow this trend of silencing or ignoring scientific opinion, but one 
of the major explanations seems to be a desire for a show of power 
and cohesive agreement within all government departments. This may 
29. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,” 133. 
30. McNaught, Pelican History of Canada, 315. 
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stem from the Stephen Harper’s own practice to never be seen making 
public gaffes. As Jonathon Gatehouse for Maclean’s writes, Harper is 
“rarely caught on the wrong foot [and is] Disciplined…above all with 
the media.”31 This discipline comes from the control of information, 
and knowing who has said what in relation to government policy.  
 If Stephen Harper desires that the federal government exude a 
sense of power and control, he must implement media policies that 
restrict the federal government’s employee’s ability to say what they 
want – differing opinions on the same subject looks bad in the media, 
and should be avoided at all cost. With the enormous number of 
public servants in the government, the risk that someone might say 
something negative against government policy rises, and with 
scientific crises becoming a hot-button issue, the Harper government 
“no longer trusts scientists to avoid controversy,”32 especially on 
politically sensitive issues like climate change or the oil sands. It is 
more essential to demonstrate to voters that every agency of the 
federal government is in an agreement with one another. This can be 
done in a variety of ways: implementing new media policies for 
particular government departments, restricting access to evidence, or 
by cutting programs that might lead to the discovery of that evidence. 
The Harper government has also favoured the use of experts who are 
likely to agree with the official party line in areas of science. For 
example, in 2007 the Harper Government announced the creation of 
the Science, Technology and Innovation Council, which was 
mandated to provide the government independent opinions and 
information on scientific and technological issues. However, only four 
full-time scientists were a part of this Council: the other fourteen 
members were business and industry experts, government officials and 
administrators.33  
 One must be careful of criticizing the government’s desire for 
conformity too harshly. After all, many would agree that it is not 
unreasonable for a government to expect their employees to respect 
the official position taken in the media, or presented to the public. As 
Andrew Leach writes in Maclean’s, “To speak out publicly against 
government policy is, by the current definition, fundamentally at 
31. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
32.Turner, The War on Science, 41.  
33.Cuddy, Troubling Evidence, 20.
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odds with the role of a public servant in our democracy.”34 Federal 
scientists are hired to research and present their findings on particular 
subjects to the government. They should not be commenting on 
issues that do not concern them, nor should they be using their 
positions as a soapbox for their own ideas.  And while many have 
criticized the government for taking this policy on employee 
cooperation too far, it does reflect the desire of Stephen Harper to 
have a government possessing one unified voice.  
 With this desire to have a unanimous voice comes the 
simultaneous ignoring of voices that do not conform to the 
government’s policy ideas. For the Harper Conservatives, this involves 
the shutting out of scientists and the inclusion of business and 
industry experts. Again, this is not necessarily a Conservative-only 
policy – some have argued science has been subordinate to industry 
since 1993 with the political shift from the Mulroney Conservatives 
to the Chrétien Liberals35 – but the Harper government continues to 
use this policy to their advantage, and to put business interests before 
scientific interests.  
 One of the most cited examples of this attitude favouring 
business interests over science interests comes from the government’s 
implementation of Bill C-38, an omnibus bill that was read into the 
law in 2012. This bill continued the tradition of having government 
departments such as the National Research Council perform, in the 
words of Chris Turner, “’concierge’ services for business and 
technology”36 – that is, science should only be used as a tool to assist 
the government’s business and industrial interests. It resulted in 
massive funding cuts for departments such as Fisheries and Oceans 
and Parks Canada. Again, it should be noted that, despite massive 
cuts and changes to scientific programs across Canada, scientists were 
not consulted during the creation of Bill C-38 in 2011.37 The voices 
that the Conservative Party chose to listen to were not scientists, but 
were business executives and policy writers.  
 Authors such as Turner also write that the government intends 
to use science as a tool for business interests, rather than seeing value 
in science itself. Science and research now has a purpose of “creating 
34. Andrew Leach, “Un-muzzle The Scientists? Not So Fast,” Maclean’s, August 24, 2014.
35. Clowater, “Canadian Science Policy,” 131.
36. Turner, The War on Science, 27.  
37. Ibid., 29.
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economic opportunities for industry”, while the government’s task “is 
to assist in that process in whatever way it can.”38 If science is only to 
be used as a tool to bring about economic investments, then the 
policies the government is pursuing make sense: they can cut 
scientific programs that do not fulfill this purpose (and potentially 
hurt this economic investment), can save money to put towards 
industrial and business incentives, and can silence any scientist who 
would only get in the way of the new economic policy.  
 If this is the policy that the Conservative government has 
chosen to follow, what effect does this have on the average Canadian 
citizen? The general consensus seems to be that there are negative 
effects. One of the biggest concerns is for the democratic process in 
relation to the government’s muzzling policies. If voters cannot access 
information that matters to them about their government, they 
cannot make informed decisions. The federal government does not 
actively circulate their funding decisions or policy implementations 
through the public sphere thanks to their media policies – instead, as 
Evidence For Democracy notes in their critique of Environment 
Canada’s media policies, there is a focus on message control rather 
than supporting effective communication between federal 
departments and the public.39 How can citizens make the right choice 
for them if they cannot access the information they require?  
 These types of policies also bring about negative connotations 
for Canada on the international stage. For example, Gatehouse’s 
Maclean’s article noted that serious damage had been done to 
Canada’s scientific reputation, and that scientists were losing funding 
opportunities due to sponsors’ leeriness of the Canadian government’s 
reaction.40 For a country that is synonymous with nature and that has 
such a rich history of scientific achievement, this poses a problem. 
What does Canada as a country become when it loses a part of its 
treasured identity?  
 Finally, it is arguable that science plays a major role in the 
Canadian system – even if, as the Conservative government puts 
forward, it is just a ‘concierge’ for business interests. According to Jeff 
Kinder and Frank Welsh, this scientific and technological system has 
38. Ibid., 112. 
39 Magnuson-Ford and Gibbs, “Can Scientists Speak?,” 13. 
40. Gatehouse, “When Science Goes Silent.”
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developed thanks to a unique relationship between “business, 
academic and government sectors.”41 If the government wishes to 
continue to use this system, all three sectors must be properly funded 
and respected. In essence, the government has to hold up its end of 
the agreement. Otherwise, the system risks underperformance or 
failure, and many aspects of Canadians’ lives could be affected.42 If 
the government wishes to continue to provide Canadian citizens a 
high quality of life, they must fund and encourage the development 
of science in the federal sectors. Ultimately, science and politics have 
enjoyed an uneasy relationship in Canada for decades, and the 
criticisms of the Conservative’s policies are just the latest in a series of 
decisions that echo this relationship. These are policies that reflect the 
desire to have conformity and unity in all departments of the federal 
government, and that also reflect science’s decreasing importance to 
the government – except in cases of economic value. With these 
policies affecting Canada’s reputation on the international stage, and 
potentially harming the democratic process at home, it remains to be 
seen whether the current Conservative government will continue to 
uphold them. What is clear, however, is that there is no easy balance 
between science and politics in Canada.  
41. Jeff Kinder and Frank Welsh, “Performing Strategic Science in the Public Interest: Updating the 
Policy Debate Regarding Government Science,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of 
Science, Technology and Medicine 35.1 (2012): 149, doi: 10.7202/1013984ar 
42. Ibid.
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